I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study the way in which individuals develop beliefs about other players' behavior in games. We distinguish two extremes according to which players may form expectations. They may act as sophisticated strategists who believe that everyone will behave fully rationally in every period, or they may act as if they are playing a game against nature. Because the focus of the paper is on the development of beliefs, and not on the question whether behavior is in accordance with these beliefs, independent information on expectations concerning the behavior of other individuals is collected in experiments.
In particular, we focus on expectation formation in step-level public goods (SLPG) games. SLPG (a.k.a. provision point public goods) are characterized by the fact that a funding threshold has to be reached before the good can be provided. We consider the case where contributions exceeding the threshold do not affect the level of provision (i.e., further contributions are redundant once the threshold is reached) and where the contribution decision is reduced to the binary choice whether or not to contribute a fixed endowment. In our SLPG games n+1 group members decide whether or not to contribute an original endowment c to a public good with value f to each member. The public good is provided if and only if the number of contributions exceeds a threshold s. Contributions falling short of the threshold are not refunded. In these games, beliefs that are relevant for the players are relatively simple to measure. All we need to know is how many other players a player expects to contribute to the public good.
To analyze the development of beliefs and especially the extent to which individuals think strategically, we use two methods. First, we derive hypotheses about beliefs that are common to equilibrium models of strategic interaction. Alternative predictions are derived from a belief learning model, abstracting from the strategic interaction. These hypotheses are tested with our data from the interactive games. As a second method to gather information about strategic thinking in belief formation, we compare beliefs in the interactive games with those in an equivalent game against nature where no interaction amongst subjects takes place.
The main objective of this paper is to find out whether or not players think strategically when forming beliefs. In the literature, there is an increasing interest in belief learning. Theoretical work investigates (asymptotic) properties of various belief learning models.
1 Usually the game theoretic assumption that players best respond to their beliefs is maintained. The difference with game theoretic modeling is that the belief learning approach assumes rather naive beliefs. A common assumption in this approach is that players neglect the strategic aspect of the game when they form their beliefs about the behavior of other players. This is elaborated below. At present, the empirical underpinning of this assumption has not yet been provided. Is the expectation formation process assumed by belief learning models in accordance with how players actually update their beliefs? In our first method of studying strategic thinking, we compare this belief learning process with that assumed in equilibrium models. Experimental evidence may serve as a guide for the development of the theoretical literature.
We shall focus on a general representative of the class of belief learning models, the so-called naive Bayesian model. In this model, players are backward looking only. They assume others' behavior to be constant (in a probabilistic sense) and independent of the experience of these others. They disregard the possibility that other people may adapt their expectations and behavior on the basis of their own experience. Basically, this implies that individuals' perception of the game is not different from the perception they would have if they played the same game against nature. The naive Bayesian model and some comparative statics results are described in the next section and derived more formally in appendix A.
Even though our paper deals with a specific game and focuses on one specific belief learning model, we think the results are of more general interest. The information gathered about how agents' beliefs develop in this particular setting can serve as a benchmark for other (theoretical, empirical, or experimental) research on expectation formation in strategic settings. We shall return to the implications of our results in the concluding section.
Former experimental work addressing issues on expectation formation or belief learning usually assumed that subjects give a best response based on their expectations. In this way indirect evidence on beliefs can be inferred from choice data. 2 This paper differs methodologically from that work in the important sense that direct evidence is obtained on expectations. 3 Subjects report their beliefs about other players' choices and they are provided with incentives to do this accurately. Incentive compatible elicitation of beliefs makes a direct study of these beliefs and the way they are updated possible (see Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram, 1996 , for a study on the relationship between beliefs and choices). 4 Another difference between this paper and former experimental work on belief learning is that expectations in SLPG games are compared to expectations in a baseline condition where subjects play a game against nature. This provides us with information for the second method of studying the role of strategic thinking. If the naive Bayesian model describes the expectation formation process, the pattern of expectations observed in the SLPG games should be similar to the pattern observed in this game against nature.
A final difference is that we not only examine voluntary provision of SLPG's with changing composition of groups (strangers), but also with constant group composition (partners). The partners condition provides information about the role of the strategic environment in the process of expectation formation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the theoretical background of our experiments is provided. We will discuss game theoretic models for behavior in SLPG games, and present the naive Bayesian model of belief learning. For the latter, some comparative statics results are presented. In section 3 the design of the experiment is discussed. Section 4 gives the experimental results. We focus on the patterns in the reported expectations. Section 5 studies the way in which beliefs are updated in more detail. By modeling the updating process in a general form, we are able to consider the structure of the errors made and the weights attached to previous observations. Section 6 contains an evaluation of our results and a concluding discussion. Appendix A describes the naive Bayesian model more formally and appendix B provides the experimental instructions.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Game theory provides a technical tool to model the strategic interaction between players. We will focus on simple models describing behavior in SLPG games before we move on to more complicated models. First, consider games of complete information. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) were probably the first to model the situation game theoretically under the assumption that players maximize expected value. In that case, the stage game possesses (n+1)!/(n+1-s)!*s! pure strategy equilibria where exactly s of the n+1 players contribute. If n+1>s>1, three symmetric equilibria exist where each player mixes with the same probability p (one of these is p=0). Offerman (1997) shows that the largest of these p's is the unique symmetric payoff dominant equilibrium of the stage game.
If t he game is repeated with the same players across periods, a simple Nash equilibrium is provided by the repetition of the stage game equilibrium in each period. For example, it might be the case that players focus on the symmetric payoff dominant equilibrium in every period. When predicting the number of other participants contributing to the public good, a player would then report a binomial (p,4) distribution based on the true probability that another player contributes in each period. In this case, she would provide the same unbiased prediction in every period.
It may be argued that it is too simple to assume that the same stage game equilibrium would be played in every period. Perhaps players focus on different stage game equilibria in distinct periods. In that case one would expect the reported distribution to shift across periods. However, from a game theoretic point of view there is no reason to expect any specific pattern to emerge in case of complete information. In fact, any pattern could emerge.
And, maybe more importantly, players should have unbiased expectations in every period in this case as well.
Similar arguments apply to more complicated game theoretic models. For example, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1988) A slightly different set-up, with similar results, is provided in Offerman et al. (1996) , where we study the case in which individuals acquire additional utility if the public good is provided.
The important common feature of these game theoretic models is that in equilibrium expectations about other group members' behavior are consistent with reality. Therefore, one
would not expect any bias in subjects' beliefs. Moreover, no specific pattern in the development of beliefs over time is predicted. We believe that this holds for all game theoretic models that have modeled behavior in SLPG games as strategic interaction. This common feature is summarized in the following hypothesis 5 :
(1) expectations about the number of contributions are unbiased; (2) there is no specific pattern in the expectations over time.
Naturally, in the future game theoretic models may be developed for SLPG games in which strategic behavior yields predictions that do not support this hypothesis. For example, it could be assumed that players have incomplete information about the rationality of other players.
As they become more experienced with the game, they could then get a better idea of the level of rationality of other players which might increase the confidence in their beliefs (cf.
El-Gamal and Palfrey, 1995, for a different game). This might provide a prediction for a specific pattern in beliefs. On the other hand, the assumption that players have unbiased beliefs seems to be at the heart of most equilibrium concepts. This is also true for the socalled quantal response equilibrium Palfrey, 1995, 1998) .
Like many other games the SLPG game is complicated from a strategic point of view. Two factors are to blame: multiple players and multiple equilibria. With more than one opponent it becomes increasingly difficult to anticipate future behavior. With multiple equilibria it is not obvious which equilibrium attracts the attention of other players. Because of these difficulties, many researchers in game theory do not simply assume that a game starts in equilibrium.
When studying behavior in experiments, for example, many studies allow for the possibility that subjects have to learn. Attention is then shifted to the learning process itself. In our case this means studying the way in which expectations about others' contributions are formed and how they develop over time. This is captured by the term 'belief learning '. 6 In complicated games it may be tempting for players to simplify by assuming an element of stability in the environment. By doing so, players neglect the strategic interaction assumed by game theoretic models. They do not take account of the possibility that other players will adjust their behavior. Stability in others' behavior implies that what happened yesterday may tell them something about what will happen tomorrow. This is precisely the simplifying heuristic assumed by many belief learning models. The literature suggests various ways in which an assumed constant element of the environment could be modeled. The simplest rule is the Cournot rule, according to which a player believes that the former outcome of the game will occur again . Other rules suggest that players look back further than the last period only. According to fictitious play, players' beliefs about the others' play in the next round are determined by the empirical frequency distribution of past play (e.g., Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993) . Crawford (1995) proposes linear adjustment rules to describe the expectation formation process. Like Brandts and Holt (1994) , Eichberger (1995) and Eichberger et al. (1993) we will focus on naive Bayesian learning.
At this stage, we would like to stress that the main question we address is whether or not strategic considerations play a role in the process of expectation formation. It is not our goal to distinguish between different belief learning models. We focus on the naive Bayesian model because we believe that it is the most general representative of the class of belief learning models. In principle, the model could be applied to any game with a finite number of players and a finite number of possible choices without the need of additional auxiliary assumptions.
Naive Bayesian learning assumes that individuals are naive in the sense that they do not take account of the fact that others think as rationally as they do. Thus, players do update beliefs in a Bayesian manner, but do not think strategically in the sense that they realize that others may do the same. If players in an SLPG game abstract from strategic aspects of the game in this way, they adapt their own expectations and behavior as the result of their private experience but assume that other group members do not adapt their expectations and behavior on the basis of their experience. Then, in principle, the behavior of the others could be learned by carefully observing these others' behavior. Of course, such an assumption is not consistent in a game theoretic sense, since others' behavior is assumed to be constant while these others, if the model is correct, also adapt their expectations and behavior on the basis of past observations. This process seems most plausible in settings where individuals are matched with different group members from period to period. Nevertheless, we will test for the its existence in a setting with fixed matchings as well. If we find that subjects in a situation with fixed partners assume that others' behavior is constant, then this provides evidence that the naive Bayesian tendency must be quite strong.
Assume that a player expects a randomly selected individual to contribute with probability θ.
The prior distribution π(θ) is assumed to be uniform on [0,1]. 7 If a randomly selected group member contributes with probability θ, the number of contributors among the other n group members is binomially (n,θ) distributed. In the ideal case, an individual will update the prior distribution on θ using Bayes' rule after observing draws from this distribution. The resulting posterior distributions on θ are known to belong to the beta family of distributions (e.g., Press, 1989) . The predictive distribution for a new observation x k+1 of the binomial process can be computed from the posterior distribution, given the former observations x 1 ,..,x k .
Details of this updating process are given in appendix A.
The naive Bayesian model describes behavior as a function of past observations. As a consequence, the model predicts that a specific pattern will emerge in subjects' beliefs. We shall call this the 'belief learning pattern'. It consists of four 'subpatterns':
1 the mean of a player's predictive distribution will increase (remain constant/decrease) if the event observed is greater than (equal to/smaller than) the former mean of her or his predictive distribution. 8 2 if y of the other group members are observed to contribute in a period, a player will not decrease the subjective probability of the event that y of the others will contribute in the next play of the game.
3 as players obtain more information, they will become more confident in their predictions, on average resulting in smaller variances of the predictive distribution.
4 if other players contribute at a decreasing (increasing) rate, a player will overestimate (underestimate) other players' contributions.
Note that patterns 1, 2, and 3 predict a pattern in expectations over time, whereas 4 predicts a bias, on the basis of a pattern in others' behavior. Hence, all four imply violations of the hypotheses described above, in (1) and (2). Patterns 1 and 2 are derived in appendix A. For the derivation of 3, it is formally required that the underlying probability θ actually does remain constant (appendix A). In our experiments, this was not the case, but the outcomes subjects observed were such that a naive Bayesian would conform to the hypothesis. Hence, a naive Bayesian would have an (on average) declining variance of the predictive distribution, in our experiments. We do not present a formal proof of pattern 4. The intuition of this hypothesis is the following. Consider the case that as time passes, fewer and fewer of the others choose to contribute. A naive Bayesian will gradually expect that fewer of the others will contribute if (s)he observes a decline in others' aggregate choices (as a consequence of pattern 1). But (s)he will adapt her or his beliefs too slowly, since (s)he maintains the false assumption that the distribution of others' choices remains constant. (S)he will continuously be 'too late' in the adaptation of her or his beliefs. Similar reasoning reveals that a naive
Bayesian will be too pessimistic if the aggregate of others' choices consistently increases over time.
Thus, if people abstract from strategic considerations when playing an SLPG game, a specific updating pattern can be expected to evolve in people's beliefs. The belief learning pattern thus provides an alternative hypothesis to the hypotheses (1) and (2), which were derived from the game theoretic models. To test for the pattern, however, we expand (1) and (2) to cover all cases where the belief learning pattern is not present. This yields the following null and alternative hypotheses:
Expectations do not follow belief learning pattern 1-4.
H 1 : over time, expectations follow the belief learning pattern 1-4.
Note that the expanded null hypothesis provides a more difficult case for rejecting (1) and (2), because any pattern other than 1-4 will yield an acceptance of the null.
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A direct test of the hypothesis H 0 versus H 1 is possible with reliable information about individuals' expectations on how many of the others will contribute to the public good in an experimental situation.
If an experiment is conducted where only a series of one shot SLPG games is played, it might be difficult to come up with a powerful test to distinguish whether people incorporate strategic considerations in their expectations (H 0 ) or follow the belief learning pattern (H 1 ).
Given that subjects are not perfect Bayesians, noise is to be expected in the naive Bayesian model even if the model gives a reasonable average description of expectation formation.
This will decrease the power of the test. Therefore, we also carried out a baseline condition where people really did play a game against nature and knew that they did. In this game the behavior of 'others' is replaced by a truly binomially (n,θ) distributed variable, such that any possible strategic considerations are eliminated. If the naive Bayesian model gives a good description of the expectation formation in SLPG games, one would expect approximately the same pattern to emerge in the public good game as in the baseline condition without interaction, with similar levels of noise in both. 10 In other words, we expect H 0 to be rejected in favor of H 1 in this game against nature.
A priori, it is not quite clear whether rejection of the H 0 would imply rejection of game theoretic equilibria for the partners condition (where subjects play a repeated game within constant groups). Even though we cannot come up with such equilibria, it is theoretically possible that complicated supergame strategies could arise which yield an equilibrium where pattern 1-4 is present. Therefore, for the partners case, rejection of the null hypothesis should be considered with this caveat in mind. On the other hand, if players remain in the same group, they have more reason to act strategically and to anticipate strategic behavior of other group members. Therefore, one might argue that the belief learning model should be expected to perform less well in the partners condition than in the strangers condition (where subjects are randomly allocated into new groups after every round). Despite this caveat with respect to the interpretation, in our view this means that it interesting to add the partners treatment in our analysis because it provides information with respect to how the strategic environment affects the extent to which subjects act like naive Bayesians.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiment consists of two (SLPG) conditions with interaction ('pubgood strangers', PGS and 'pubgood partners', PGP), and one condition without interaction ('nature', NT). Details are given below. An example of the instructions used is presented in appendix B. All rules of the game were carefully communicated to the subjects, who had to answer some questions testing understanding before the start of the experiment. In all four conditions subjects played 20 periods. Subjects made choices simultaneously and communication was
prohibited. The description of the rules and possible actions was neutral: words like 'public good', 'cooperate' and 'invest' were avoided. The experiment was completely computerized.
In the partners condition the composition of each group of five players is constant; in the strangers condition it varies over periods. Subjects did not know the identity of other group members. In the public good experiments subjects are endowed with 60 cents (at the time of the experiments, the exchange rate was approximately: 100 Dutch cents=±0.65 dollar). The public good (with a value of 245 per person ) is provided if and only if 3 or more group members contribute their endowment.
In the NT condition subjects are informed that their payoffs depend on their decision whether or not to invest and on the number of red balls in a cage (cf. Table I ). At the beginning of each period the cage is 'emptied' and four new balls are drawn at random by the computer and 'put in the cage'. Subjects know that, for each ball, there is an equal probability p of being red. Thus, the number of red balls is binomially (4,p) distributed. At the start of the first period subjects do not know anything about the value of p, but they do know that p will remain constant during the experiment. To make NT and PGS as comparable as possible, p was chosen to be equal to the observed average contribution rate in PGS (0.5042). Different individuals observed different and independent realizations of the binomial (4,0.5042) process. In this way, subjects in NT observe different outcomes from the (same) binomial process, just like subjects in PGS observe different aggregate contribution levels because they are in different groups. Table I shows that the same payoff structure underlies all three games.
After a subject had made the decision whether or not to contribute (invest), her or his expectations about other group members' decisions or the number of red balls in the cage were elicited. Subjects were asked to report (in percentages) their subjectively estimated probabilities that the outcomes 0,1,2,3 and 4 would occur. They were encouraged to report probabilities truthfully and seriously by an incentive compatible payoff scheme, using the quadratic scoring-rule (Murphy and Winkler, 1970; Selten, 1998) . Denote the reported probabilities that outcome i (0<i<4) will occur by p i and assume that the realized outcome is j. The quadratic scoring rule gives the individual a payoff in Dutch cents of Q j : 
The payoffs by this rule induce someone maximizing expected value or someone maximizing a linear utility function to report expectations truthfully. This scoring-rule was given to the subjects on a handout. It was emphasized that no mathematical understanding of the equation was needed. It was explained to the subjects that it was in their own best interest to report probabilities truthfully.
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At the end of a period, subjects were informed about the aggregate contributions of the others (the number of red balls in the cage), and the resulting payoffs for their contribution decision and for their reported probabilities. Then the game proceeded to the next period.
Subjects
In total, 109 subjects participated. The subject pool was the undergraduate population of the University of Amsterdam. A majority of 59% of the subjects majored in economics or econometrics; 75% of the subjects were male. There was a show-up fee of 5 guilders. In addition in about 2-2 1/2 hours an average of 40 guilders (=±$ 26) was earned by the subjects.
In PGS 64 (PGP: 21) subjects participated in 4 (PGP: 1) sessions. In each PGSsession, 15 (PGP: 20) subjects were allocated to 3 (PGP: 4) groups to play the game and 1 was appointed monitor (to assure participants that no deceit was taking place). In NT, 24 subjects participated in one session and no monitor was used.
IV. RESULTS

Choices
Before discussing the expectation formation process of subjects in SLPG games, we briefly focus on choices and on the relationship between expectations and choices. In aggregate, contribution levels in PGS and PGP (50%; 56%) are similar to investments in NT (51%). The aggregate contribution levels are approximately stable.
Next, we check whether the contribution decision is related to the probability of being critical in the way theory predicts.
12 Individuals should be more inclined to contribute if they estimate the probability of being critical to be higher. Figure 1 displays the fraction of contributions as a function of the subjectively estimated probability of being critical. The subjective probability of being critical is given by the reported probability p 2 . Note from the figure that in all cases, there is a positive relationship between the probability of being critical and the contribution levels. Hence, a subject's belief about other players' behavior is a relevant factor when explaining her or his choice.
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Nevertheless, the step-function at 32% (predicted by expected value maximization) is not observed. Table II shows the percentages of choices that are exactly consistent with the hypothesis of expected value maximization given the reported probability of being critical. It also shows the percentages of choices that are exactly consistent with the hypothesis of expected value maximization using beliefs derived from the naive Bayesian model. The latter case allows one to judge to what extent actual choices are consistent with those a naive Bayesian would make. In either case a considerable gap exists between observed and predicted choices. This gap may (partially) be explained by subjects' risk and/or altruism attitudes.
14 Because this paper focuses on the development of beliefs, we shall not elaborate further on the contribution and investment decisions in our experiments.
Dynamic pattern in the expectations
We start by testing the hypotheses predicted by the equilibrium models of strategic Recall the four subpatterns of the belief learning pattern. The first is that the mean of the reported distribution in any period will be smaller (equal/greater) than the mean in the previous period if the outcome was smaller (equal/greater) than the reported mean in that period. The second is that the reported probability of a particular outcome does not decrease if that outcome is observed. The third subpattern is that the variance of the reported distribution will decrease on average, as more information is revealed. Finally, the fourth makes predictions about the bias in the beliefs. Since some people may follow Bayes' rule (qualitatively) and others may not, and since some individuals may abstract from strategic considerations while others may not, the analysis is carried out at the individual level.
To test the first subpattern, for each individual the number of times is counted that the mean shifts in the direction predicted by the belief learning pattern and the number of times that it does not. An individual's mean shifts in the direction predicted if in the previous period a greater (equal, smaller) outcome was observed than the reported mean and the mean in this period is greater (equal, smaller) than the mean in the former period. An individual's mean does not shift in the direction predicted if in the previous period a greater (smaller) outcome was observed than the reported mean and the mean in this period is smaller (greater) than the mean in the former period.
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The second subpattern is tested in a similar way. We count the number of times that an individual shifts the estimated probability of the previous outcome in the direction predicted by H 1 and the number of shifts in the opposite direction. The probability of the previous outcome shifts in the direction predicted if it increases and it shifts in opposite direction if it decreases. If it remains constant, it is assumed to be inconclusive. For subpatterns 3 and 4, we have now shown that subjects' beliefs are qualitatively in line with the beliefs of a naive Bayesian, for the given history. The subpatterns 3 and 4 as formulated are more explicit, however. They predict a specific correlation. For subpattern 3 the correlation is a negative one with the period number. For subpattern 4 it is a positive one with the contributions of other players. What remains to be done is therefore to check whether a naive Bayesian would follow the patterns predicted (a decreasing variance and a positive/negative bias when others are contributing at a decreasing/increasing rate). Because Table III shows that our subjects' behavior are in line with a naive Bayesian's behavior, this would imply that our subjects follow the patterns as described. By computing the naive Bayesian beliefs for every history observed, it turns out that this is indeed the case.
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The results presented in Table III appear to be relatively weakest for subpattern 3. Subjects' confidence (as measured by the variance of the reported distribution) shifts in the direction that is predicted by the naive Bayesian model (i.e., the variance decreases) significantly more often than in the opposite direction, but the latter happens more often than in the other subpatterns. Nevertheless, it turns out that subjects become more confident as they gain experience in the game, as predicted. The reason why we have tested the third subpattern by comparing shifts in the variance to the shifts that a naive Bayesian would show, is that the prediction for any given period is dependent on the specific history an individual has observed. As mentioned above, the actual observations imply a decline in variance on average, which is the way we formulated the pattern. As an alternative to the test used in Table III , we can test this decline directly by comparing the variance in periods 1-5 with that in periods 6-10. The results of this test support the conclusion that the result is weakest for subpattern 3. In PGS (PGP) the average variance declines from 0.80 (0.80) to 0.65 (0.75) whereas it remains constant at 1.23 for NT. Only the decline in PGS is statistically significant (Wilcoxon, Z=-4.53, p<0.01).
The fourth subpattern is prominent in our experimental data. Hence, the naive Bayesian belief learning model does a good job in predicting the bias in subjects' beliefs.
Overall, in line with this belief learning model, subjects are too optimistic about the behavior of others in the SLPG conditions PGS and PGP (they expect more 'cooperative' behavior than is actually observed). That people tend to be too optimistic about others' contributions in SLPG games was conjectured by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) and also found in Offerman et al. (1996) for other payoff-parameters.
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All in all, the belief learning pattern underlying H 1 finds clear support in our experimental data for the games with interaction between subjects. This holds for each of the four subpatterns. Now, turn to the results for the game against nature (the 'second method' discussed in the introduction). The success of the assumption that subjects neglect strategic aspects in these SLPG games can be judged by a comparison with the benchmark provided by NT. First note that subjects are slightly pessimistic about the outcome of the game in NT (i.e, they underestimate the number of red balls in the cage, as the model predicts them to be for the history observed). The most remarkable result in Table III is, however, that the belief learning pattern emerges even more pronounced in PGS and PGP, than in NT. This justifies the conclusion that individuals play these SLPG games as if they are playing a game against nature. Moreover, the relatively moderate NT result implies that noise observed in the naive model when applied to SLPG games cannot simply be attributed to the strategic interaction with other subjects. It is larger when there is no interaction. We attribute this noise to imperfect updating. This is elaborated in the following section.
Finally, note that the belief learning pattern is also observed in the partners condition PGP, where strategic reasoning is much easier than in the strangers condition PGS. This result is consistent with the assumption that players neglect the strategic aspects of the SLPG games. (Schmalensee, 1976; Dunning et al., 1990; Vallone et al., 1990; Griffin and Tversky, 1992) .
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Overconfidence is not observed in subjects' distributions in NT. Here, the reported variance is slightly greater in rank than the naive Bayesian's variance, though far from significant (Z=-0.14; p=0.89). So we find that subjects are overconfident in the SLPG games, but not in the related game against nature. This remarkable result may indicate that the game against nature is perceived to be more difficult (cf. section 6).
V. ERRORS AND HISTORY DEPENDENCE IN EXPECTATION FORMATION
Given that people tend to perceive an SLPG game as a decision theoretic problem instead of as a strategic game, one can move on to investigate the way in which subjects handle this problem. In this section, we will consider the process by which subjects update their beliefs in more detail. In particular, we will focus on two aspects of this process: the structure of the errors made and the way past observations are used to update beliefs. We consider a general model of belief updating in which various specifications (including the naive Bayesian) are nested and estimate its parameters.
As a point of departure, we take the naive Bayesian belief learning model. Denote the mean number of contributions predicted by this model by x it . This prediction depends on the individual, i, and period, t, because it is history dependent. Next, we allow for individual errors when subjects determine and report their beliefs. Denoting the mean of the reported distribution by y it , this yields:
where ε it is an individual and time specific error term. We allow for a very general error structure and will use the experimental data to estimate specific parameters of it. This structure is described by the following equations. ε i1 =ν i1 ; ε it =ρ i ε it-1 +ν it, , t>1; (2a)
Equation (2a) allows for auto-correlation in the error term ε it . This auto-correlation is allowed to be individual specific. The error term ν it used in this auto-correlative process is elaborated in (2b). The parameter a allows for a systematic bias in the reported expectations. Note that this bias reflects the difference between the reported mean and the mean predicted by the model and not the difference between the reported and actually observed mean. The latter bias was considered (and observed) in the fourth subpattern 4 in the previous sections. The parameter σ i allows for heteroscedasticity, because the variance may vary across individuals.
Finally, it is assumed that the errors ν it (but not ε it , of course) are independent draws.
Next, consider the process by which beliefs are updated using past observations. Until now, we have assumed updating with optimal use of the information contained in previous observations. Now, we characterize the updating process in more detail. We start by describing how aggregate previous observations are used to predict a new mean. For this, we use the analysis of the naive Bayesian model presented in appendix A. In particular, applying proposition 2 with n=4 allows us to derive the mean of the distribution predicted by the model:
where s it-1 denotes the sum of former contributions (or red balls).
In eq. (3) it is assumed that subjects attribute equal weight on every former observation. In practice, some subjects might attribute relatively high value to recent observations (denoted by 'recency') or to early observations ('primacy'). 20 To allow for these possibilities, we attach weights to the way in which former observations determine s it-1 . For period t, The denominator in (4) ensures that the the weights sum up to 1. The term (t-1) converts the result into a weighted sum (as opposed to a weighted average). The parameter c i allows for a wide range of aggregation processes, by allowing for varying speeds in the updating process. (1)- (4) attributes relatively high value to recent observations, implying recency. If c i <0 the model attributes relatively low value to recent observations, implying primacy. As mentioned above, if c i =0 the model describes pure Bayesian updating.
In the limiting case where c→∞, (4) reduces to: s it-1 = (t-1)*z it-1 , so full weight is attributed to the most recent observation. However, it is more common to consider primacy of the form s it-1 = z it-1 . In the spirit of Milgrom and Roberts (1991) we call this the 'Cournot model', because it assumes that players only remember the most recent observation. Even though this is not completely nested in (4), we shall report estimates of this model as well.
For the Cournot model, eq. (3) needs to be adapted to x it =(z it-1 +1) *2/3. 21 In the model, the variance σ i and correlation ρ i are allowed to vary across individuals, as is the parameter c i . When estimating the parameters of the model, it turned out that all variation across individuals in ρ compensated the variation in σ such that the covariance between ε t and ε t-1 (denoted by cov) remained more or less constant. This can be captured by either estimating the variation in σ or the variation in ρ across individuals, while keeping cov constant.
22 Therefore, we assume cov constant over i: cov i =cov, ∀i, but allow σ i to vary over i. The parameter ρ i automatically varies with σ i to keep cov constant. The likelihood of the estimated equations did not improve when this was replaced by estimation in which both ρ i and σ i vary freely across subjects. Finally, we allow for the possibility that different people use different updating speeds, by allowing c to vary over i.
The estimated values of σ i and cov will give us information about the errors subjects make when updating beliefs, and the estimated values of c i provides information on order effects. The following iterative procedure is used to estimate the parameters c i , cov, and σ i for each condition. We start with a base model that assumes homogeneity of the population.
From this we allow for heterogeneity by allowing the variables σ i and c i to vary across individuals. It turns out that adding different parameters σ i increases the likelihood of the data more than adding different parameters c i . Therefore, the number of different error parameters used is estimated, by iteratively adding σ i 's to the base model until the likelihood is not increased significantly (likelihood ratio test). If more than one σ i is added to the base model, the proportion p i of the population using each σ i is estimated as well. Second, given the number of errors estimated in each condition, different updating strategies c i are
iteratively added to the model in a similar way. Table IV presents the results of the estimations. The first two sets of results concern the base model (for comparison with the general model) and the Cournot model (which is prominant in the literature), respectively. In both cases, we have restricted the error structure by not allowing differences in ρ i and σ i across individuals. The parameters of the models (σ, cov, a) are presented, as well as the log likelihood. The 'general model' results concern the procedure described above, allowing for multiple c i 's and σ i 's in the population. The parameters p i describe the fraction of the population using various parameters.
A first thing to note from these results is that the base model seems to do better than the Cournot model in all four conditions. Though the models are not nested, the difference in likelihood for two models estimated with the same data-set and using the same number of parameters is clearly suggestive. Furthermore, the error rate is much smaller for the base model. This suggests that it is likely that when adapting expectations subjects take all former observations into account, not only the most recent observation.
Next, consider the results for the general model. A remarkable result is the difference in updating speed between the condition without interaction (NT) and the SLPG conditions with interaction (PGS and PGP). In NT, primacy is observed in the updating of subjects (c<0), whereas in the other conditions no systematic deviations from (true) Bayesian updating are observed. Even in NT, there is no variation in c across individuals (only one c is selected by the estimation procedure). In fact, for the SLPG games, the only deviation from naive
Bayesian updating as described in the base model is given by a varying degree of errors across individuals. Apparently, subjects differ in the extent to which they err against the model.
23
We developed this model in order to study the structure of the errors made in the updating process and the weight attached to observed outcomes. With respect to the weights, we find that (except for NT) more or less equal weights are attached to all outcomes, as Bayesian theory prescribes. With respect to the error structure we find the following. First, there is a bias in the reported distribution (compared to the model). It is difficult to draw conclusions from this bias, however, because it is positive in PGS and PGP and negative in NT. The varying degrees of error (as measured by ρ i or σ i ) are found in all conditions, however. This is interesting in the light of recent studies on the role of errors in game theoretic analyses (e.g., Palfrey, 1994, 1998; Anderson, Goeree, and Holt, 1998) . In these studies, errors are typically added to the best response functions. Moreover, the same error distribution is generally used for all subjects. Our results indicate that it is worthwhile to consider the errors subjects make when forming beliefs and to allow for differences in the distribution across subjects.
VI. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
This paper focused on the expectation formation process in various SLPG games.
Two new elements were introduced to the design of SLPG experiments. First, we explicitly gathered information about individual expectations in an incentive compatible way. Second, we added a condition in which a game against nature was played by subjects that was equivalent to the SLPG games used. These elements allowed us to assess how players form their beliefs in these games.
The evidence suggests strongly that subjects neglect the strategic aspect of the SLPG games. In our experiments, subjects' expectations conform to the dynamic pattern predicted by a naive Bayesian belief learning model based on the assumption that players abstract from strategic reasoning. In addition, the noise observed against this pattern is not greater in the SLPG games than in the true game against nature. This suggests that deviations from the belief learning pattern can be attributed to imperfect Bayesian updating, and not to sophisticated strategic reasoning. This result may even be stronger when it is realized that the belief learning model even describes expectations well in partners conditions, where the possibility of strategic reasoning is large.
Rejection of strategic reasoning in the formation of beliefs implies a rejection of existing game theoretic models. Third, our conclusion that the process of expectation formation is captured by the belief learning model does certainly not imply that the concept of Nash equilibrium is useless. Many learning models do not need strategic thinking and rationality to converge to a Nash equilibrium (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1991) . Such a Nash equilibrium can then be interpreted as a rest point of a learning model. For example, assume that the decision rule is based on a cutpoint: contribute if and only if the probability of being critical is estimated to be larger than some cutpoint. In that case simulations show that the decisions often converge to some Nash equilibrium. Hence, what we are observing might be behavior on a path towards equilibrium. Future research will have to show under what circumstances this path leads to equilibrium and whether or not specific equilibria are favored. Note, however, that convergence to a Nash equilibrium was not yet observed in the 20 periods of the experimental SLPG games. In fact, the support for the belief learning pattern is (almost) as strong in the last 5 periods of the experiment as in the periods before. The adaptation process has not (yet) led to consistent expectations.
Even though we found support for the belief learning pattern in our data, the model discussed in the previous section shows that subjects do not always act exactly according to the naive Bayesian model. In the game against nature, a notable difference between the actual updating process and the ideal Bayesian updating process is that people tend to underweight the impact of new evidence. Primacy in the judgments was only found in this condition, however. In the various SLPG games the introduction of a recency/primacy parameter in the model did not increase the likelihood of the data significantly. Equal weight is attributed to each observation, as prescribed by naive Bayesian updating. Although there is not much variation across subjects with respect to recency/primacy in updating, there is considerable variation in the errors they make.
A striking difference between reported distributions in the public good games and reported distributions in the game against nature is that people tend to be overconfident in the public good games, but not in the game against nature. In addition, when running the experiments, we noticed that it took subjects considerably more time to make decisions in the game against nature than in the public good games. From a rational point of view this difference is puzzling. The decisions in the public good games are more difficult, because of the strategic interaction between the subjects. This interaction implies that if subjects predict how many of the others will contribute, they should consider the possibility that others' behavior changes over time. In that case other group members do not contribute with a constant probability, which makes the prediction-task more difficult than in the game against nature, where a constant probability was used. Of course, the lack of evidence for the assumption of strategic reasoning would explain that players are as confident in the game against nature as they are in the public good games. But it does not explain the greater confidence observed in the public good games.
From a psychological point of view this asymmetry in confidence may be more understandable. The social interaction in the public goods game may have increased the confidence in people's judgments and the speed of decision-making because it reminded them of similar situations in daily life. The task in the game against nature may have been perceived as more abstract and difficult, because the resemblance with daily life is more remote.
An alternative explanation for the asymmetry in overconfidence is that in the games with interaction subjects believe that other subjects focus on the efficient outcome. The efficient outcome cannot be this kind of focal point in the game against nature. This explanation would suggest that subjects are strategic in the sense that they try to look forward on the basis of the characteristics of the game. Our present design cannot distinguish between these two explanations. It is an interesting topic for future research.
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The behavior in SLPG games should be seen as the result of a combination of expectation formation on one hand, and individuals' decision rules on the other. This paper is concerned with expectation formation. The appendix provides a formal elaboration of the assumption that people abstract from strategic considerations in their expectation formation. The decision rule then determines whether people will contribute or not, given these expectations. In a companion paper we study the decision rule. Amongst others, we conclude that decision rules vary systematically across individuals (Offerman et al., 1996) .
An interesting question for future research is whether the assumption that subjects play strategic games as games against nature can be generalized successfully to other games.
In principle the naive Bayesian model can be extended to any game where players form expectations about other players' decisions. If players' strategy sets have n>2 options, the updating process can be derived using the Dirichlet (multivariate Beta) distribution. We expect that the naive Bayesian model will perform better in strategically complicated games than in strategically transparent games.
data. 6 A different matter is what the long term properties of the (belief) learning process is. We will return to this matter in section 6. 7 Subjects in an experiment could have a different prior belief on q, even if they have not observed any realization in the laboratory. Homegrown beliefs do not affect the comparative statics results discussed later if they are (approximately) the result of the following process:
originally the individual had an uninformative prior distribution, but before (s)he entered the laboratory (s)he observed some fictitious behavior by others. 8 This subpattern is related to the standard relationship between a marginal and average value.
Note, however, that this is only the case because of the behavioral assumption of believed constancy in the behavior of others. If this constancy is not assumed, there is no reason to expect that the predictive distribution in period t will react to the results of period t-1 in this way. 9 The relevance of these hypotheses for the situation with fixed group composition is discussed below. 10 Note that the Bayesian updating process without strategic considerations is not naive in the game against nature. 11 Offerman et al. (1996) shows that the beliefs elicited in this way have reasonable properties. Tests in Sonnemans et al. (1998) show that choices are not systematically affected by this belief elicitation. Sonnemans and Offerman (1999) provide tests in support of the behavioral incentive compatibility of the quadratic scoring rule. 12 Expected value maximization implies that an individual should contribute if and only if the expected probability of being critical is thought to be greater than 32%. 13 Much social psychological work also stresses the importance of beliefs when explaining choices in public good games. For references to this type of work, see Offerman, 1997 . This finding suggests that the structure of reinforcement learning is too simple to explain behavior in public good games (Roth and Erev, 1995) . Reinforcement learning assumes that successful choices tend to be repeated and unsuccessful choices tend to be abandoned. Hence, beliefs are not thought to be relevant when explaining behavior.
14 In other studies, systematic differences between individuals in various SLPG games were shown to exist (Offerman et al., 1996; Sonnemans et al., 1998) . 15 This definition of shifts leaves some cases undefined. Our reason for doing this is that some cases seem inconclusive. For example, consider the case that in the former period a higher outcome than expected is observed but that the individual's reported mean in the new period is the same as the one in the former. Strictly speaking, this might be seen as a mistake. On the other hand, it may be that the already accumulated evidence is so strong that a true Bayesian would imperceptibly update the mean in the light of the new observation. This may induce even true Bayesians to report the same distribution. 16 Details are available from the authors. 17 The naive Bayesian belief learning model not only accounts for the direction of the bias in subjects' beliefs, it also accounts for the magnitude of the bias. We compared the bias in the reported means with the bias in the means of the naive Bayesian prediction (the predicted mean minus the real outcome). The Spearman rank correlation between these two bias variables varies between 78% and 87% for the four conditions. 18 Only uni-modal distributions were used as observations for these tests. Individual distributions were used as units of observation. Similar results were obtained using observations at the group/session level. 19 In PGS group composition changes each period. Therefore, it does not make sense to estimate the probability of being critical to be 100% in this condition. Nevertheless, in 1.2% of the cases subjects estimate this probability as 100%. In PGP subjects estimate a 100% probability of being critical in 2.5% of the cases. 20 For a review of the psychological literature on these so-called 'order effects in belief updating', see Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) . For an example in economics, see El-Gamal and Grether (1995) . 21 Formally, proposition 2 in the appendix, underlying eq. (3), is only derived for the base model. It can be shown, however, that it also holds for the more general aggregation function (4) . For the Cournot model, the adaptation presented is needed. The straightforward proof can be obtained from the authors.
